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Opposing the Lottery in the U.S.: The Forces Behind
Individual Attitudes towards Legalization in 19751

ANDREW ECONOMOPOULOS
Ursinus College
ABSTRACT In the 1970s opposition to the lottery started to fracture in the US. This
study examines the historical changes leading up to the I 970s, the factors that contributed
to an individual's attitude towards legalization, and the causes of the fracture. The Survey
ofAmerican Gambling Attitudes and Behaviours (1975) indicates that opponents held to
the traditional arguments against the lottery - negative economic effect, costs to others,
and increased crime. Unlike the past, there was weak religious institutional opposition to
the lottery in lottery states; only individuals with a strong commitment to their religious
affiliation were more resistant to pro-lottery arguments, but in most cases could be
convinced to support the lottery. The pre-WWII generation remained steadfast against the
lottery, but time was on the lottery proponent's 'side as there was relatively greater support
among post-WWII generation. The lo git model was used to predict future adoptions of
large sample states. As expected, the attitudes of 1975 showed states with low opposition
were likely to adopt earlier than high opposition states.

Introduction
Public policy issues relating to personal behaviour have produced heated debates. Central
to these debates is the question of the government's role in shaping the behaviour of its
citizens for the "public good" .

There is no formal definition of the "public good", but its

ethos is institutionally defined by the policy actions of the legislature and the courts.
These decisions are influenced by a complex set of factors and there pronouncements, as
Robert Wuthnow argues, represent the "implicit and explicit claims about the character of
the nation itself, the propriety of its actions, and the nature of its place in history and in the
world." (Wuthnow 242)

One public policy issue that has gone through a dramatic shift in

the last forty years in the U.S. and has shaped the character of the nation has been the issue
of state-sponsored gambling. Although the shift has been a recent phenomenon, American
history reveals the gambling industry has already experienced both the extremes of
prohibition and freedom.
Coltfleter & Cook (1990), Filer, Moak and Uze, (1988), Martin and Yandle (1990),
Berry and Berry (1990), Erkeson, Platt, Whistler, and Ziegert (1999) and Pierce and Miller
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(2001) have examined the factors influencing state adoption of lotteries using panel data of
state-level economic and demographic characteristics. This study, however, will examine
the issue of legalization by focusing on the attitudes of the constituents to see if there was a
breakdown in the attitudes opposing gambling. In order to analyse the shift in attitudes a
review of the historical underpinnings of the debate is given in the next section. This brief
review focuses on the issues that have shaped public opinion. In the third section, a simple
behavioural model is presented that examines the decision making calculus of the
individual. Data from the National Commission on Gambling (1975) is used to determine
the factors that drove attitudes about the lottery. The legalization model is then validated
by predicting which states were ready for lottery adoption.
Historical Overview of the Opposition to Gambling in the U.S.
During the 19th century, gambling opponents were very effective in limiting the public in
gambling opportunities. Fogel (2000) and Blakely ( 1977) argue that much of their success
was due to a strong and organised voice from the extremes in the Christian community.
The conservatives argued that gambling would corrupt the moral and productive character
of the gambler as well as those who enforced the program. The liberals argued that
gambling would lead to economic ruin for many and would be a regressive form of
taxation. When the coalitions need to be extended beyond core followers opposition
leaders linked gambling to the economic conduct of their employees and to the cultural
values of their social class. As one reformer argued "gambling affect(s) good families and
result(s) in pilfering by employees ... children will be left unfit to be leaders of business and
society - squandering fortunes."(Beisel, 1990, p. 51) These arguments broaden the antigambling appeal by linking it to issues supported by the non-religious middle and upper
class.
The opposition to gambling continued throughout the l 91h and early part of the 201h
centuries until 1930s when the economic tolls of the depression pressed community groups
to find alternative sources of revenue. To meet the financial needs of the organizations,
state legislatures allowed churches, primarily Catholic, and charitable non-profit
orga nizations to offered bingo to their members and the community.

The Catholic

Church found no problem with the promotion of bingo; it was considered neither a sin nor
was it harmful to society. The editor of a Catholic magazine echoed the sentiments of
many in the Catholic Church when he said " . .. that the playing of a game for a prize is not
evil but often engrossing and refreshing recreation ... (Although) a game of chance ... can
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be abused, the mere possibility of abuse does not make the game itself wrong".
(Commonweal, 1960, p 282)

If bingo was not legalised in a state by 1950, it was

effectively de facto legal for religious organizations in many non-gambling states.2
In addition to bingo, several other gambling activities during this period were

placed before the legislature. The second most successful game was pari-mutuel betting;
six states legalizing betting on horses in the I 930s and by 1950 twenty-five states had
legalised pari-mutuel betting. 3 Culturally, horse racing was considered a "sport" and the
enforcement of illegal wagering was nonexistent in many states. During the 1930s states
were in need of revenue, and by codifying the game the states were able to take a share of
the stakes. Although state-run lottery legislation was proposed in several legislatures
during the 1930s, none were approved. 4 Its failure to gain support could have been due to
the nature of the kind of gambling activity. Whereas bingo was seen as a recreational
activity that cost very little to participate, the lottery was viewed as a "pure chance" game.
After World War II, the religious opposition continued to fracture. Conservatives
shifted their concerns to the moral condition of individuals and less interested in political
solutions. Leading this shift was Billy Graham. Liberals, as Fogel (2000, p.172) observed,
followed a new paradigm in which "moral vices became illnesses (addictions) better
treated by secular therapists than by legal prohibition or moral suasion." This shift to the
secular, to the social scientist, is consistent with what Wuthnow observed in the American
Church. Wuthnow (1988) argues that this shift was due, in part, to the divergence in the
education level of the members of many of the main line denominations. In the late 1950s
and early 1960s, those that held a liberal theology were more likely to have a college
education and were also less likely to have a common core set of beliefs. Individualism
was taking hold in the liberal church and although the leadership of the liberal side was
willing to continue to fight for gambling prohibition, they were not able to marshal the
membership to fight for the cause.
New Hampshire Lottery - The Leak in the Dam
The... first breakthrough came in New Hampshire. After 27 years of lottery proposals the
pure chance lottery finally gained enough support in the legislature and the governor's
office to become law in 1963. The most prominent advocate for the lottery was Governor
King. The Governor addressed the moral arguments against the lottery and highlighted the
economic realities of taxation. On the moral issue King argued that "you can not legislate
morals ... the 'little people' have more common sense than to overindulge in the
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sweepstakes against overwhelming odds."5 On the issue of taxation, King argued that the
state should receive and control the revenue, not the criminals and with the "increasing
demands for school facilities, at a time when our people are already carrying a cross of
taxation unequalled in American history, it (is) our duty to initiate programs which will
relieve this heavy burden on the people."6
Although there were several prominent groups opposing the law - the Protestant
Christian Civic League, educators, businessman, and economists - their arguments did not
resonated with the public. 7 The religious groups gave the same arguments that were used
in the 19th century; it would corrupt the morals of the individual and of the politicians.
Speaking for the educators, the Concord Superintendent of Schools stated "he knows no
NH educator who favours the bill and that it is vigorously opposed publicly by most." The
educator's concern was not gambling per se but that education would be supported by an
unsound method of financing.8 While the economists argued against the lottery because it
would not meet the long-term financial needs of the state and that a new source of tax
revenues was needed. 9
By 1974, eleven more states had enacted state-sponsored lotteries: seven of those
states earmarked revenues for general use, three state earmarked revenues for education
and one of the states earmarked revenue for senior citizens. The growth and acceptance of
state lotteries eventually gave way to easing the prohibition on casino gambling. As
history showed the public shed its cultural history and began a new era of public policy.
Taxation and Enactment
The historical overview suggests that economic pressures exerted at the right point
in time were enough to weaken the resolve of opponents and opened the door for state
sanctioned gambling. Most researchers have used some measure of tax burden as a proxy
for economic pressure on the legislature. In New Hampshire it appears that Governor King
was referring to the burden of property taxes. New Hampshire, unlike most states, had
neither an income tax nor a sales tax and most of the State and Local Revenues came from

°

property taxes and excise taxes. 1 Compared to other states, see Table 1, New Hampshire
relied
... heavily on property taxes as a source of revenue. However, New Hampshire's total
taxes collected as a percent of personal income (the average tax rate) was below more than
half the states.

INSERT TABLE l
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The high property tax burden of the citizenship also appears to be the case with
those states that passed lottery legislation prior to 1975. The average property tax burden
of lottery states was close to 51 % as compared to a property tax burden of 39% in nonlottery states, while the average tax rate of lottery states was slightly below the average tax
rate of states that relied on an income tax. Although it appears that the type of tax may
have been crucial in the passage of lottery legislation, the evidence is not convincing.
There were eleven states in 1963 that did not enact a lottery by 1975 that had property tax
burdens above 50% and had an average tax rate above the national average. If the tax
burden was critical to the calculus of the public's consent then we would have expected
those states to be among the first to enact a lottery. Thus, the tax burden alone may not
provide a clear picture on what reduced the opposition in these lottery states. A model of
opposition must also include cultural and perceptional attitudes of the public.
Modelling the Opposition to the Lottery
After 25 years of lottery history, several researchers, Filer, et al. (1988), Berry and Berry
(1990) Martin and Yandle (199D) and Erekson, et al. (1999), have examined the factors

that influenced the adoption of lottery legislation from various approaches. The core
theoretical framework of these studies is to examine factors that will lead the legislator to
maximize their support. Unlike previous studies, this study will examine the motivations
of individuals at a time in lottery legislative history when the debate for legalization was at
critical point. Understanding the factors that motivated an individual's political position
will allow us to predict which states will succeed in passing lottery legislation and which
states will continue to be the future battlegrounds.
As the historical review above reveals the decision to oppose legalization is based
on the cultural and economic background of the individual.

The decision calculus of the

individual to support or opposed the lottery is based on the individual's net expected value
of a policy change. In this case it is assumed that the policy change is a liberalization of
the lottery prohibition. Let
E[:(..j]

= {a E[NDBi + NIBj]

} x ma

Be the net expect value of liberalization where a is the subjective probability of the success
of enacting gambling policy j, NDBj is the perceived net direct benefit - the difference
between perceived direct benefits and direct costs - and NIBj is the perceived net indirect
benefit - the difference between perceived indirect benefits and costs - of gambling policy
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j for individual a. Each expected value is weighted by CDa which represented the
individual's personal interest in the public policy.

CDa

takes on a value between zero and

one with a zero indicating no interest and a one indicating extremely important issue. The
benefit and cost assessments with each category are subjective and the individual's
evaluation may overestimate or underestimate the "true" values. When the Expected Total
Net Benefit (E[NBj]) > 0, the individual places net value on policy liberalization j. When
E[NBj] < 0, the individual places a net cost on policy liberalizationj. Thus, the expected
value of liberalization is positively correlated with the attitude toward the policy; the larger
(smaller) the expected net benefit, the greater the support (opposition) to the legislation.
Direct benefits and costs are defined as those that the individual believes will
directly impact their personal wealth from the liberalization of gambling. 11 (See Table 2
panel A for a summary.) There are several direct private benefits from gambling
liberalization. First, there are the benefits that are received by those who are the providers
and associates of gambling services. This would include firms and their employees
involved in gambling activities, firms that supply inputs to the gambling industry,
employees of the government agency directly benefiting from gambling revenues, and
firms in complimentary industries. Second, there is the perceived reduction in the tax
burden from the new revenue source. Supporters of liberalization, as echoed above by
Governor King, argue that the legalization will provide tax relief. Gambling revenues will
come for three potential sources: new players from within the state, current in-state players
who have gone out-of-state, and out-of-state players who will come into the state to play.
Individuals in the highest tax brackets are most likely to perceive the greatest advantage,
especially in states that have a progressive income tax. Third, there is a direct private
benefit for those who will receive subsidised government services from the gambling
revenues. Fourth, liberalization will lead to lower transaction costs for gamblers.
Liberalization typically implies increased access to gambling services which will lower the
transaction costs. Finally, there are direct non-pecuniary benefits to individuals who may
have a reduction in emotional stress from the legalization. These individuals could be
gambling illegally, face the potential of being arrested for their activities, and gaining relief
~

from legalization.
INSERT TABLE 2
There are also direct costs from liberalization. Firms and individuals who compete
with the gambling industry would face direct costs from lost sales and employment.
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Indirect private costs also occur when the individual gambler exceeds the expected budget
outlay for their gambling activity. If the deficit is credit financed, then the unanticipated
interest expense would result in an opportunity cost; representing the reduction of future
purchases of other commodities. 12 In the extreme some would file for bankruptcy and
would result in non-pecuniary hardships for the family.
Indirect costs and benefits are those that are perceived by the individual that spill
over into society from the enactment of the policy which could ultimately impact their own
personal wealth or the wealth of others. (See Table 2 panel B for summary.) These benefits
and costs can be viewed in monetary terms where imputed values are calculated or in nonpecuniary terms where values are incalculable other than through the revealed preference
towards legalization. One indirect perceived benefit is the benefit that others gain from the
government services resulting from gambling. If the gambling revenues are earmarked for
health care or education, non-recipients of these benefits may place value on these services
to others. They may also place value on the indirect (or spill over) benefits that may occur
from a healthier populace or more educated society. A second indirect benefit is perceived
when gambling revenues are expected to revitalize a particular region even though they do
not live in the region and the individual expects to gain indirect benefits in the future from
a reduce tax burden. A third benefit, some have argued is that individuals will gain an
indirect benefit from legalization when crime prevention and adjudicated resources are
freed-up and can be reallocated to other areas. This will ultimately reduce crime in other
areas and benefit neighbourhoods. Finally, some individuals will place value on the new
opportunities given to others. Some may value new opportunities given to individuals who
could advance in society from the winnings, or as some have put it, the lottery could
increase hope to individuals. These values represent non-pecuniary benefits gained from
legalization.
The perceived indirect cost of liberalization includes the decline in productivity,
increased criminal activity, and increased welfare costs. Historically, many have argued
that gambling will impact an individual's conduct at work. The "get rich quick" attitude
am.~mg

gamblers will produce shirking at the workplace and reduce productivity. This

belief has lead some to perceive an economic loss to society. In addition to loss
productivity, many have argued that legalization will increase crime. Addicted gamblers
will need to support their deficits through theft and other illegal activities; thus requiring an
increase in crime prevention resources. Third, individuals may perceive that there will be
indirect welfare costs to society including an increase in social services costs to treat the
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increase in problem and pathologically addicted gamblers, an opportunity cost for
reallocating revenues to this new problem, and an increase in welfare costs due to the
financial losses of low-income gamblers. In addition to potential measurable indirect
costs, there are some that are immeasurable. Individuals will place a value on the social
consequences of the policy. For these individuals the consequences of gambling will
include the perceived decline in morals, the increase struggle for low-income families or
families with addicted loved-ones.
The value an individual places on a policy is weighted (ma) by their personal
interest in the policy and the cultural context in which they live. This interest can be
motivated by a number of different factors. One factor can be the individual's own
experience with gambling. Increased exposure or participation enables an individual to
form their own personal feelings towards the activity. Another factor that will motivate
individuals would be their "moral" conviction about gambling. Strong moral convictions
can be motivated by religious teachings or by political philosophy; conservative Christians
may have just as strong an interest in the policy as libertarians. Where the Christian is
likely to strongly oppose liberalization, the libertarian is likely to strongly support
liberalization. A third factor that motivates individuals is the degree to which the
individual is directly a recipient of a benefit or cost. Direct recipients will be more
interested in the policy and place a higher weight on the value of the policy. A final factor
is the individual's exposure to the range of viewpoints. Meier ( 1994) argues an individual
who experiences a wider variety of viewpoints or a few viewpoints is more likely to have a
stronger interest in the policy than an individual who has some experiences but not enough
to become interested in the policy. An individual who been exposed to a wide variety of
viewpoints may develop a tolerance and may argue for tolerance in social issues. An
individual who has little exposure will want to maintain the status quo and therefore resist
any change in policy.

Data and Empirical Model

In 1975 national survey individuals were asked their opinions about the legal status of the
'

various gambling activities. For those individuals who lived in a state that allowed a
lottery, they were asked if they would vote to abolish it. For those individuals who lived in
a state that prohibited the lottery, they were asked if they would continue its current status.
In either case a one was assign to the individual (Ai) who believed that gambling should be
illegal and zero otherwise. From the theory above a logit model is used to assess the factors
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that influence an individual's attitude towards legalization. (See Table 3 for the labels for
the variables and expected signs.):
Ai = ao + a1 TBi + a2PMBi + a3%NEIG + Cl4lGAMi + as ECONi + a50THERSi +
a1CRIMEi +asNGSi + a9AGEi + a10AGE2i + a11URBANi + a12PPi + a13EDi + a14_
19RELi + a20RC + I 811s (LOTTERY x X1-1s) +Yi
Expected Hypotheses - Net Direct Benefit

Several variables were included to capture net direct benefits: tax burden (TB), percent of
neighbouring states having the lottery (%NEIGH), competing industry (PMB), and illegal
gambler (!GAN). Two measures of tax burden were used in separate models: the percent
of tax revenues that comes from property taxes, and the average tax rate of the state. We
would expect that higher tax burden states will show less opposition than low tax burden
states. To capture the potential revenue leaving the state due to neighbouring states
having the lottery, the percent of contiguous states with state lotteries was used. The higher
the percentage the more likely individuals would show less opposition. A dummy variable
for states that only had pari-mutuel betting was used as a proxy to indicate the cost to
competing industries. Individuals would perceive the lottery as a competitor to the parimutuel industry and we would expect more opposition to the lottery. Finally, we would
individuals who place an illegal bet in 1974 are less willing to oppose legalization. These
individuals ~ave a strong interest in reducing the risk associated with their illegal
participation.
INSERT TABLE 3
Expected Hypotheses - Net Indirect Benefits
Three variables are used to account for the individual's calculus on the perceived net

indirect benefits: the net economic benefits, the impact on others, and the impact on crime.
To measure the perception of net economic benefits (ECON) an index was created from
three questions posed to the respondents:
1. Will the lottery raise more money to run the government?

2. Will the lottery provide more jobs?
3. Will the lottery cause individuals to be less productive?

An index value of 0 indicates that the lottery will have no economic benefits to society (the
individual disagreed with one and two and agreed with three) while an index value of 1
indicates that the lottery will produce economic benefits for society. It is expected that the
higher the index the lower the opposition to the legalization of the lottery.

10

A second index was created to reflect the individual's perceive impact of
gambling's on other individuals (OTHERS). Two questions were asked:
1. Will gambling cause individuals to spend more than they can afford?
2. Will more children be influenced by gambling?
If the respondent affirmed both statements the index would have a value of one. If the

respondent disagreed with the statements the index would be zero. We would expect a
positive relationship between the index and the level of opposition. The final indirect
variable is a dummy variable on the individuals perception of gambling's impact on crime.
CRIME is a value of one when the respondent believes that legalization will increase
organised crime, while a zero if legalization will not increase organise crime. We would
expect a positive relationship between CRIME and opposition.

Expected Hypothesis on Cultural and Individual Factors Influencing the Policy Weight
In the area of cultural exposure, we include several variables that provide cultural proxies
for the individual. The first is a dummy variable for individuals who live in a state that
permitted no gambling (NGS), including a prohibition on bingo. The public policy of the
state would be a proxy for the cultural attitudes within the state. The individual will be
more likely to oppose legalization if they lived in a state that had no gambling. We would
expect less opposition by individuals who are exposed to gambling. Age (AGE) was
included in the model to account for the cultural up-bringing and economic interest in
legalization. AGE and AGE2 are included since we would expect that the younger
generations would be more supportive of gambling than senior citizens who were brought
up prior to WWII. Younger generations are more likely to go against the status quo while
older generations were raised with the attitude that gambling is a destructive behaviour.
We would also expect that the opposition will be stronger the older one gets as the
individuals belief system solidifies with little chance of wavering.
The final cultural exposure variable - URBAN - is the residency of the individual.
Meier (1994) has argued that individuals living in urban centres are exposed to a greater

..

diversity of backgrounds and lifestyles and are therefore more tolerant of gambling
behaviour. These individuals would have a lower estimate of social costs, and higher
estimate of social benefits. Therefore, urban dwellers are more likely to support lottery
legislation.
Six variables are used to capture the personal attitudes toward gambling policy:
political philosophy (PP), education (ED), religious affiliation (REL), and religious
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commitment (RC). An individual who holds to a libertarian political philosophy is likely
to support legalization. A libertarian index, ranging from zero to one, was developed from
the responses to three questions dealing with the legalization of illegal activities:
marijuana, prostitution, and pornography. An individual who would say yes to the
legalization to all three would be given a value of one and if they said no to all three, a
value of zero.

The educational attainment of the individual may also impact how they

view the legalization of gambling. Two dummy variables were created to designate the
level of education. For individuals who at least hold a high school degree (HSDGREE)
were given a value of one and zero otherwise.·If the individual receive a college degree or
received post graduate education, a value of one was given to COLLEGE, and zero
otherwise. As Wuthnow (172) noted, education had changed the individual's attitude
toward religious doctrine from a strict adherence to greater acceptance of other ideas.
Thus, the higher the education the individuals will show greater openness to legalization
and would be less likely to oppose legalization.
Finally, the religious orientation of the individual will also influence their attitudes
towards legalization. Two variables were used to identify religious orientation: religious
affiliation (REL) and religious commitment (RC). Six dummy variables were used to
categorise the individual's religious (or non-religious) affiliation: Catholic, Main Line
Protestant, Methodist, Baptist, Fundamental, and Atheist/Agnostic. The more conservative
the denomination the more likely the denomination would advocate opposition to
legalization. We would expect Catholic (the most liberal towards gambling) to be least
likely to oppose while Fundamentalist (most conservative toward gambling) most likely to
oppose. As noted above social advocates of Main Line Protestants churches opposed
gambling in New Hampshire. However, these denominations also contained a growing
segment of educated members who were more tolerant of gambling. Thus, it is uncertain
as to the expected sign. At this time Methodists were considered slightly more
conservative than Main Line, but more liberal that Baptists while Baptists were slightly
more liberal than Fundamentalists. There is no basis to determine the sign on the Atheist.
However, Economopoulos (2005) has shown that Atheists during the 1970s were not likely
~

to participate as gamblers, and if they applied their practice to their policy they would
oppose legalization, holding all other factors constant. In addition to religious affiliation a
measure of religious conviction was also included. Commitment was measured by how
often the individual attended church related functions. Respondents were asked how often
they attended religious services with responses ranging from not at all to more than once a
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week. An individual who attended more often was more likely to hold to the tenants of
their faith and more likely to oppose legalization.
The last set of variables is a group of interaction variables to account for the
potential differences in how individuals in lottery states respond differently than
individuals in non-lottery states to the explanatory factors. Each of the explanatory
variables (explained above and labelled Xi) are multiplied by a dummy variable
(LOTTERY) where an individual who is living in a lottery state is designated as a one, and
in a non-lottery state is designated zero. If individuals in lottery states are more accepting
of the lottery, the expected sign of the interaction variable is expected to be the opposite of
the theoretical sign argued above. 13

Results
The maximum likelihood estimates and the marginal probabilities of the main model
variables and significant interaction variables are given in Table 4 and 4b 14 . Comparing
both Tax Models it is clear that the type of tax burden variable used in the model does not
change any of the signs nor change the size of the other coefficients significantly. All the
coefficients that were statistically significant in the Property Tax model remain statistically
significant and have the expected signs in the State-Tax model. Surprisingly, there very
few interaction variables were significant suggesting that individuals in lottery states
reacted no differently than individuals in non-lottery states.
The evidence on the net direct benefit variables indicates that two of the variables parimutuel and illegal gambler - were statistically significant at least at the 5% level. An
individual who lives in a pari-mutuel state is 12.5%-12.8% more likely to oppose the
lottery than an individual on a non-pari-mutuel state. As expected individuals who gamble
illegally are 23.1 %-23.6% less likely to oppose the lottery. Although the signs on the tax
burden variables are as expected they

INSERT TABLE 4
are statistically insignificant. As Table 1 suggested above, the evidence of the average tax
bmclen provides no clear signal on a state's willingness to adopt the lottery. 15

It appears

that Governor King's the tax burden argument may not have been the critical factor for the
general public in approving the lottery at this point in time of lottery history. Likewise, the
lottery policy of neighbouring states had no impact on an individual's opposition to the
lottery.

13
All three perceived indirect benefits determined the level of opposition to the
lottery. As expected the individuals who believed the lottery will hurt others and will
increase crime will be 7.4%-7.7% and 6.6%-6.7% more likely to oppose the lottery, both
variables significant at least at the 5% level. Individuals who believe that the lottery will
provide economic benefits to the state and believe that the lottery will not reduce
productivity are 8.9%-9.5% less likely to oppose the lottery. Thus, individual's perception
of indirect impacts on society could potentially shift the level of opposition as much as
24%.
All but one non-religious cultural or personal characteristic was statistically
significant and had the expected signs. The only characteristic that was not statistically
significant was Urban. It appears that urban centres do not appear to promote a spirit of
diversity as Meier suggested, and there level of opposition was not different than an
individual living in the country. Individuals in non-gambling states were 11.5%-12.5%
more likely to oppose the lottery, holding all other factors constant. Thus, there is a strong
level of opposition to retain the status quo. The coefficients on the age variable do suggest
that there were generational differences in their level of opposition. Younger individuals
are more likely to support prohibition, but as they grow older this attitude declines during
their middle ages and then rises as a senior. (See Figure 1.) The data suggests young
adults ( 18-25) were just as likely to oppose the lottery as were their pre-retirement elders
(55-62). Middle-aged adults were least likely to oppose the lottery, but the turning point
for this cohort was for those who were born prior to 1934. Seniors retirees were more
likely to oppose the lottery than any age group.
INSERT FIGURE 1.

As expected, those who hold a libertarian political philosophy were 7.6%-7.7%
less likely to oppose legalization. The education level does determine an individual' s level
of opposition but it differs significantly in the state the individual lives. An individual in
non-lottery states with no high school degree are more likely to oppose the lottery than an
~

individual who holds a degree. Individuals with at least a college degree will be 12.6%
less likely to oppose than non-degree individuals, but they are not as adamant as
individuals with at least a high school degree. High school degree holders are 19.4%19.9% less likely to oppose the lottery. The stronger preference among high school degree
holders could be from a longing to advancement to the next economic-social level.
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If these degree holders live in lottery states, the attitude towards opposition

changes. (See Table 4b.) Adding the marginal probabilities of the High School
coefficients provides the level of opposition by a high school degree holder in a lottery
state. The evidence indicates that high school degree holders are no different in their
opposition than non-degree holders with a coefficient close to zero. Likewise college
degree holders are not only less likely to oppose, but show a greater willingness to oppose
the lottery in their state - between 13.5% and 13.9% level of opposition. This significant
swing suggests that these individual may be observing something that has created concern.
The religious affiliation variables confirm the notion that conservative
denominations were willing to oppose the lottery. Both Baptists and Fundamentalists are
the only groups that showed significant levels of opposition towards the lottery: Baptists
are 16.3% and Fundamentalists were about 28% more likely to oppose the lottery.
Surprisingly atheists in lottery states were very much opposed to the lottery; they were
42%-44% more likely to oppose gambling. For supporters of the lottery, the opposition of
atheist should not be a concern since they made up less than 2% of the population. The
signs on Catholics and Main Line Protestant do show less opposition as expected but they
were not significant.

However, holding religious affiliation constant, individual's

attendance to religious services more often are more likely to oppose the lottery. Those
who attend religious service on a weekly basis (52 times per year) have a 5.2%-5.3%
higher probability to oppose the lottery than a causal attendee (30 times per year). These
results suggest that religious opposition should not be solely identified by an individual's
denomination, but also by a broader designation.
In summary, the evidence does give a clear picture of the opposition. Opposition
was primarily from individuals who have a deep religious commitment and who perceived
the lottery's negative consequences on society. However, a comparison of the marginal
probabilities between the religious influences and the indirect perception influences on
opposition indicates that advocacy groups can mitigate the religious influence by changing
their perception. Opposition is even greater where there was some gambling industry
already established and a demographic with an older population.
~

Religious Opposition in Lottery States
The small number of significant interaction variables suggests that there was very little
distinction between individuals in lottery and non-lottery states. However, the inclusion of
interaction variables could have created significant multicollinearity among the variables.

To determine if multicollinearity is present, two alternative models are presents: one
model includes all non-religious interaction variables and the other only religious
interaction variables and the education variables. The education variables were included
with religious for the purpose of controlling the liberalization of religious attitudes within
religious communities.
The results of th~ two alternative models are presented in Table 5. The model of
only non-religious interaction variables continues to support the original model; none of
the interaction variables were statistically significant, expect for the education variables.
The size of the coefficients on the significant variables did not change significantly from
the original model suggesting that the elimination of the dummies did not introduce any
bias and would not change any of the earlier implications. Thus, individuals in lottery
states responded no differently to these influences than non-lottery state individuals.

INSERT TABLE 5
The religious interaction model, however, yielded very different results. The
coefficients on the main set of variables for both the property tax and state tax models
remain statistically significant and were close to the size of the original model. 16 The
influence of denominational affiliation, however, had change significantly, and provides a
clearer picture of the religious opposition. For those who live in non-lottery states Catholic
and Main Line Protestants were no different than the benchmark faith, they neither showed
more or less opposition. The coefficient on the Methodist variable is now statistically
significant, compared to the original model, and shows that Methodists were more likely to
oppose the lottery in non-lottery states. Baptists and Fundamentalists continue to oppose
the lottery. What the alternative model also reveals is that there is a significant and
dramatic difference between the non-lottery-state individuals and lottery-state individuals
in these religious denominations. All of the lottery-state religious denomination interaction
variables - except the Fundamentalists - are all negative, statistically significant, and are of
a size that indicates less opposition to the lottery. The sign of the Fundamentalists even
sh~~s

less opposition in lottery state; the size of which indicates that Fundamentalists

almost shows little opposition to the lottery. The coefficient, however, is barely
statistically insignificant. Finally, the religious attendance interaction coefficient in both
models is statistically insignificant suggesting that religious conviction shows consistent
opposition among the faithful.
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Since the survey of attitudes had occurred after the adoptions, these results suggest
that the religious coalitions had either lost there determination prior to their adoption or
they became more tolerant of the lottery and a.part of the cultural institution. This
outcome can not be attributed to the liberalization of these religious denominations vis-avia the educational level of congregants since this was held constant. The near statistical
acceptance of the Fundamentalists in lottery states, however, does suggests that the lottery
became more culturally accepted within these states.

Opposition, Economic Persuasion, and Religious Commitment
Since an individual's perception about the lottery can be influenced by advertising
campaigns, policy groups may be effective by changing a small element of an individual's
attitude in one of the key perception areas. As noted earlier, a change in one of the net
indirect benefits could potentially increase or decrease the opposition as much as 24%.
Depending on the level of public opinion this change could potentially switch the outcome
of a state referendum. Thus, it is critical to understand how resistant individuals were in
changing their perceptions are. To what level do we find individuals who have a deep
commitment change their level of opposition when they are given new information about
perceived benefits and costs?
Two additional models are examined to determine the degree of resistance that an
individual's religious commitment or religious affiliation has on the level of opposition
from net indirect influences. Interaction variables are included in the Property-Tax
Religious-Lottery Interaction Model where the pari-mutuel betting state variable, and the
net indirect perception variables are multiplied by a dummy variable (DR) designating a
"religious" individual. A religious individual is defined as one who attends religious
services more than once a week or is classified as Baptist or Fundamentalist. Thus,

/3 o + /3 1 TBi + /3 2PMBi + /3 2bPMBi x DRC + /3 3%NEIGi + /3 4IGAMi + /3 s ECONi
+ /3 sb Econi x DRC + /3 60THERSi + /3 6bOTHERSi x DRC + /3 1CRIMEi
+ /3 7b CRIMEi x DRC + /3 sNGSi + /3 9AGEi + /3 10AGE2i + /3 11 URBANi + /3 12PPi
.,. + /3 nEDi + /3 14-19REL + /3 20RC + L 81420 (LOTTERY x REL & ED VAR 14-20)

Ai=

+

Ei

If a religious individual's opposition is solely based on a moral opposition, whether it is a

moral bad or a moral injustice to others, we would expect that they would not be
influenced by or more resistant to these economic considerations. Thus, we would expect
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that {3 2b >0 and {3 sb >0 such that we would expect little or small response based on these
factors. For those perception variables that impact others and increase crime, we would
expect that they would have greater response to these perceptions. Thus, it is expected that
{3 6b <0, and {3 7b<0. The results of the interaction variables, given in Table 6 17 , indicate

that individuals with high religious attendance are no different than non-religious
individuals in all of the areas examined except for the lottery's impact on others; religious
individuals will have a stronger level of opposition than less-religious individuals. 18
Baptists and Fundamentalists responded differently than the general public with respect to
two of the interaction variables: hurting others and economic benefits. The size and the
sign on the Economic Benefits' coefficient are as expected, it is statistically significant.
INSERT TABLE 6
at the 5% level. These denominations were less persuaded by the economic benefits
arguments suggesting stronger resistant. The coefficient on hurting others is unexpected; it
is negative and significant. Like the economic benefits argument, Baptists and
Fundamentalists are less responsive to the perception that gambling impacts others. Given
the results of Tables 5 & 6, it appears that some of the staunchest opponents to the lottery
are not likely to change their opposition and for those who have deep religious convictions
are likely to respond significantly to the lottery' s impact on others.
Predicting Lottery Acceptance
Given our understanding of those who oppose the lottery we can use the model to examine

the likelihood that a non-lottery state as of 1974 would adopt the lottery some time in the
future. The Property-Tax Religious-Education Interaction Model is used to calculate
individual probabilities of opposition within each state with a sample over 24 and the
median and mean opposition probabilities are calculated. The results are provided in Table
7. The model does have some merit in predicting lottery adoption, suggesting that the
individuals of the survey may have been a reasonable sample for the legislative attitudes of
the populace of the states. In general states with the lowest opposition adopted a state-run
lottery sooner than those states with high opposition. A ranking score of 92% indicates
that the model can place a state's adoption very close to the expected time relative to the
other states. 19 However, the evidence raises additional questions as to why it took so long
for some of the states to adopt lotteries where there appears to be strong support for a
lottery and what changes occurred in Kentucky and Texas that lead to adoption when the
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state showed significant opposition. Further study on the legislative process within these
states may explain the delay of implementation.
INSERT TABLE 7

Conclusion
The arguments used in the past still held significance in determining an individual's
attitude towards the lottery. Economic benefits were just as persuasive in impacting an
individual's attitude as the perceived cost to society. Religious opposition continued to be
strong in non-lottery states, but was significantly less in lottery states. Thus, the earlier
coalitions of protestant denominations were either losing their influence in lottery states
leading to their adoption, or the lottery experience lead many individuals with a history of
opposition to change their attitude about the lottery. An individual's religious commitment,
however, holding affiliation constant, was the more important factor in determining
opposition. These strong opponents, however, were just as open to the arguments as the
general public and a change in their perception could shift their attitudes considerably
depending upon their background. Finally, it appears that some opposition came within
states that already had an established gambling sector - pari-mutuel betting.
The age demographic and the gambling culture of the states were key factors that
foretold the future of the lottery. Individuals born during the depression strongiy opposed
the lottery, but those born after WWII were less likely to oppose. Within a half a
generation, the opposition was going to lose a large cohort. States that had other kinds of
gambling activities were more receptive to the lottery, and provided cases in which other
individuals were able to evaluate the net private benefits and costs. As the impact of
gambling became evident, the public became more open to its adoption. Although the
adoptions were not immediate, states appear to be on track for its adoption. It was a matter
of time as the generations changed, and public-interest groups and industry-related groups
identified the key touch-points of the individual's calculus, that society was ready for the
lottery.
This research was funded, in part, by a grant from the Carnegie Mellon Foundation.
In.._Chicago, the Catholic Church issued a letter requesting parishes to discontinue bingo nights when it was
found in violation of the law. (Commonweal, 1960) In NYC, the Deputy Chief Inspector was embroiled in a
controversy when he started to close down bingo nights at local churches. (N.Y Times, 1954).
3 See Weinstein and Deitch (1974) pages 13-14.
4 See Brenner and Brenner for the list of states. They also noted that the marketers of the 1930s found ways
to take advantage of the increase willingness to participate in a game of chance. It became a widespread
practice for companies to run "contests". Since it was not a "pure chance" game, the customer received
something for their purchase, contests were not considered a lottery.
5 Weinstein and Deitch, p15.
1

2
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Found in L. Starkey. (1964), pp.76-77.
J. Gould of the New York Times Magazine (1963) reviews the coalitions opposing and supporting the
lottery.
8 ibid, p. 104.
9 See, D. Ford in The Reporter, p. 33.
10 Property taxes are considered one of the most onerous taxes by the general public and senior citizens.
McManus (1995)
11 Walker and Barnett ( 1999) give a thought provoking critique of how researchers have defined the social
costs of gambling. They define social costs on an aggregate level and argue that a transfer of wealth from
one individual to another should not constitute a social cost. However, since this model focuses on the
individual's perception of benefits and costs, an individual's decisions may not reflect the true benefit or cost
to themselves or society. They assess the policy in terms of the benefits or costs they directly expect to
realize, and the benefits and costs that may be realized through third party activity. Thus, we divide the
analysis into direct and indirect benefits and costs. In the literature indirect benefits and costs have been
called social, spillover or external benefits and costs.
12 If the individual ahs a spouse who engages in gambling, they may perceive a direct cost if the spouse
spends more than financially budgeted.
13 Two variables are not interacted with the lottery - Parimutuel and Non-Gambling Sate - since neither state
type of states allowed the lottery.
14 Insignificant interaction variables are not included in the table. The complete results are available upon
request. Marginal probabilities are estimated by examining a unit change in the independent variable,
holding all other variables constant at assumed values. Continuous variables were assumed at there mean
value, and dummy variables were assumed to be for the following characteristics: state characteristics -a parimutuel, non-gambling, and rural; individual characteristics - illegal gambler, high school degree, and Jewish
religious affiliation . For continuous variables the unit change is 10% from the mean. For indexes the unit
change is in terms of the actual discreet change in the variable.
15 A model was run to examine ifthe individual's income given their state's tax burden would influence their
opposition. All test of tax burden variables are insignificant and doe not change the signs and significance of
the other variables in the model.
16 The level of significance also increase suggesting that the non-religious variables were creating some
measure of multicollinearity.
17 Only the interaction variables and the religious commitment variable are provided in the table. All other
coefficients had the same sign, within the same size, and had the same level of statistical significance as the
original model.
18 This result is likely due to the presence of multicollinearity in the model. When the Fundamentalist
dummy is dropped from the model, the property tax interaction variable is statistically significant. The same
result held true for the religious attendance model.
19 The score was calculated by taking the difference squared in actual rank from the expected rank, divided
by 240 (the score if the model predicted the completely wrong ranking), and subtracting this percentage from
one.
6
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Table 1. Tax Burden of States in 1963
Number
of States
No Income Tax States
Income Tax States
New Hampshire
Lottery States by 1974
High Non-Lottery States

16
34

11
11
Source: U.S. Statistical Abstract 1964

Average Prop
Tax as% of
Total Taxes
49.80%
39%
63.30%
50.7%
56.5%

Average
Tax
Rate
9.20%
9.60%
8.90%
9.2%
10.0%
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.

T a ble 2 S ummary ofB enefits
1 and COStS F rom L 1b erar1zaf 100
0

Panel A
Costs

Benefits
Direct

Profits to Firms
Profits to Associated Firms
Tax Relief
Government Services Recipient
Lower Transaction Costs
Non-pecuniary benefits

· Losses to Competing Firms
Bankruptcy Costs
Non-pecuniary costs

Panel B
Indirect Spill over Benefits
Economic Development
Freeing-up Resources
Non-Pecuniary Benefits

Productivity Loss
Increase Welfare Costs
Increase Criminal/Corruption
Non-Pecuniary Costs
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Table 3. Factors Influencing Gambling Attitudes toward Opposition of the Lottery
I n d epend ent Varia
. bles Used Ill
. Ana1ys1s
1 .

Type
Net Direct
Benefits
Net Indirect
Benefits:
Cultural/
Personal
Attitudes

Variable

Label

TB
PMB
%NEIG
IGAM
ECON
OTHERS
CRIME

Tax Burden
Pari-Mutuel Betting State
% Neighbouring States having Lottery
Gambled Illegally in 1974
Positive Economic Development
Gambling Hurts Others
Gambling will Increase Crime

NGS
AGE
AGE SQ
URBAN

Non-Gambling State
Age of the Individual
Age squared
Urban Resident
Political Philosophy
Educational Level
Religious Denomination
Religious Commitment

pp

ED
REL
RC

Expected
Sign*
-

+
-

-

+
+
+
-

+
-

?

+

*Factors that identify individuals who oppose legalization are expected to have a positive coefficient and
those that suooort legalization (or less opposition) are expected to have a negative coefficient.
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Table 4. Lo2istic Model of those Opposin2 the Lottery (Main Model)
State Tax Burden

Intercept

MLE
0.0146

Marginal
Probabilities

I0.014)

Property Tax Model
Coeff
-0.192

Marginal

I0.222)

Net Direct Benefits
Property Tax Burden

-0.012

-0.010

(1.23)

Average State Tax

-0.034

-0.008

(-0.479)

Parimutuel State

0.708

0.125

(2.25)**

%Neighboring State- Lottery

-0.003
-1.761

0.003

1.403

-0.231

0.652

0.074

-1.267

0.067

0.633

-0.095

Age2

-0.083

0.115
-0.002

-2.036
-0.844
-0.712
-0.184
-0.085

-0.077

0.538

-0.199

0.701

-0.126

1.165

-0.037

-0.075

-0.018

0.012
(3.87)***

-1.974

-0.076

-0.814

-0.194

-0.696

-0.126

-0.144

-0.015

-0.026

-0.005

(0.061)

0.123

0.549

0.064

(1.33)

0.163

0.695

0.163

(1 .83)*

0.279

1.184

0.285

(2.67)***

-0.016

(-0.131)

Religious Attendance

-0.030

(0.384)

(2.59}**

Atheist

-0.304

(1 .97)**

(1 .79)*

Fundamentalist

-0.001

(3.20)***

(1 .29)

Baptist

0.125

(5.38)***

(-0.201)

Methodist

-0.089

(1.40)

(-0.487)

Main Line Protestant

0.066

(2.58)**

-0.065

(-2.02)

Catholic

-0.075
0.001

(-3.33)***

College Degree

0.686

0.001

(-5.53)***

H.S. Degree

-1.286

(2.35)**

(-0.065)

Political Philosophy

0.636

(-2.47)**

-0.295

0.077

(1 .96)**

(2.67)***

Urban

1.440

(3.51 )***

(1.79)*

Age

-0.236

(2.36}**

(-3.46)***

Cultural/Personal
Non-Gambling State

-1.748

(3.98)***

(2.40)**

Economic Benefit

-0.003

(3.94)***

(3.86)***

Increases Crime

-0.003
(0.669)

(-3.96)***

Net Indirect Benefits
Hurts Others

0.128

(2.26)**

(0.662)

Illegal Gambler

0.706

-0.027

-0.003

(-0.047)

0.052

0.012
(3.87)***

0.053
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Table 4b. Logistic Model of those Opposing the Lottery- (Continue - Interaction Variables)
Dependent: Opposition to

State

T

T .. v

~H~-.,

State/Property Tax x Lottery

-0.088

Neighbor x Lottery

0.008

Marginal

--0.008

. ,iliti....

1-0.779)

0.746
-0.420

0.148

0.552

-0.029

0.142

0.041

Age x Lottery
Urban x Lottery

-0.013

0.012
-0.006

(0.608)

0.076

0.684
0.851
1.296
-0.377
-0.273
-0.925

0.024

-0.474

0 .200

-0.524

0.261

1.907

-0.066

0 .004

0.354
0.590
0.784
1.293
-0.465

-0.017

-0.375

-0.005
0.041
0.022
0.190
0.265
-0.041
0.034

(-0.584)

-0.094

-0 .989

-0.106

(1.47)

-0.185

-0.476

-0.058

(-0.788)

-0.131

-0.451

-0.056

(-0.529)

0.444

1.814

0.424

(2.00)**

0.020

0.004

(0.822)

I0.728)

Concordant

88.7%

88.7%

McFadden's R2

37.8%

37.9%

Sample Size

1433

1433

T-Statistics in ( ). ***,**,*significant at the I %,5%, 10% levels .

.,.

0.033

(-0.833)

(2.09)**

Religious Attend x Lottery

0.018

(2.32)**

(-0.618)

Atheist x Lottery

0.043

(1.94)*

(-0.773)

Fundamentalist x Lottery

0.036

(0.962)

(-1.36)

Baptist x Lottery

0.031

(0.989)

(-0.420)

Methodist x Lottery

-0.035
0.000

(-0.663)

Main Line x Lottery

0.222

(0.132)

(2.32)**

Catholic x Lottery

0.560

0 .000

(2.09)**

College x Lottery

-0.518

(-0.836)

(1.11)

HS x Lottery

0.691

(-0.252)

0.387

0.007

(0.386)

(1.09)

Pol Philosophy x Lottery

0 .009

(1 .30)

(0.245)

Age x Lottery

'---'--iliti....

(-0.882)

(1.27)

Economic Benefit x Lottery

-0.002

(1 .02)

(0.69)

Increase Crime x Lottery

...

-0.004
(1.34)

(1 .10)

Hurt Others x Lottery

Marginal

1-0.232)

0.009

(1 .20)

Illegal Gambler x Lottery

Property
T .. v

0.017
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Figure 1
Probabilty to Oppose Legalization of the Lottery
Base on Age
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Table 5. Lo2istic Model of those Opposin2 the Lottery (Alternative Models)
Non-Religious
Interactions Only
State Tax
Property

Intercept

Religious & Education
Interactions Only
State Tax
Property

MLE

MLE

MLE

MLE

0.026

-0.176

-0.161

-0.267

(0.024)

(-0.205)

(-0.148)

(-0.315)

Net Direct Benefits
Property Tax Burden
Property Tax x Lottery

-0.013

-0.013

(-1.34)

(-1.52)

-0.003
(-0.195)

Average State Tax
State Tax x Lottery

-0.035

-0.054

(-0.503)

(-0.810)

-0.090
(-0.827)

Parimutuel State
Net Indirect Benefits
%Neighboring State- Lottery
Neighbor x Lottery
//legal Gambler
//legal Gambler x Lottery
Hurts Others
Hurt Others x Lottery
Increases Crime
Increase Crime x Lottery
Economic Benefit
Economic Benefit x Lottery
Non-Gambling State
Cultural/Personal
Age
Age x Lottery
Age2

0.663

0.658

1.028

1.002

(2.13)**

(2.125)**

(3.65)***

(3.58)***

-0.004

-0.004

0.000

0.000

(-0.726)

(-0.738)

(0.057)

(0.110)

0.007

0.008

(1 .16)

(1 .298)

-1.695

-1.683

-1.493

-1.499

(-3.82)***

(-3.803)***

(-4.39)***

(-4.42)***

0.687

0.633

(1 .02)

(0.942)

1.424

1.466

1.210

1.213

(3.92)***

(4.061 )***

(4.11)***

(4.13)***

-0.430

-0.546

(-0.716)

(-0.950)

0.640

0.625

0.883

0.875

(2.36)**

(2.317)**

(4.26)***

(4.23)***

0.456

0.474

(1.08)

(1 .123)

-1.246

-1.271

-1.275

-1 .280

(-3.43)***

(-3.49)***

(-4.49)***

(-4.51 )***

0.060

0.160

(0.104)

(0.282)

0.627

0.675

0.925

0.966

(1.79)*

(1 .94)*

(2.86)***

(3.00)***

-0.081

-0.071

-0.089

-0.089

(-2.44)**

(-2.28)**

(-3.30)***

(-3.29)***

-0.014

-0.040

(-0.298)

1.04

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

(2.67)***

(2.55)**

(3.49)***

(3.50)***

Age2 x Lottery

0.000

0.000

.

(0.132)

(0.719)

-0.276

-0.285

-0 .177

-0.204

(-1.29)

(-1 .33)

(1.05)

(1 .20)

Urban x Lottery

0.355

0.318

(1 .02)

(0.918)

Political Philosophy

-1 .989

-1 .929

-1.825

-1.801

(-5.48)***

(-5.33)

(-6.11 )***

(-6.04)***

0.599

0.517

10.990\

I0.857\

Urban

Pol Philosophy x Lottery
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Table 5. Logistic Model of those Opposing the Lottery (Alternative Models)
(Continue)
Religious & Education
Interactions

Non-Religious
Interactions
State Tax
MLE
H.S. Degree
HS x Lottery
College Degree
College x Lottery
Catholic

Property
MLE

-0.818

-0.777

-0.778

-0.760

(-3.08)***

(-3.25)***

(-3.16)***

0.751

0.668

0.679

0.663

(1.90)*

(1.71)*

(1.92)*

(1 .89)*

-0.691

-0.660

-0.658

-0.650

(-1 .99)**

1.89*

(-1 .92)*

(-1.90)*

1.213

1.189

1.017

1.042

(2.25)**

(2.21 )**

(2.02)**

(2.07)**

-0.344

-0.347

0.103

0.121

(-1 .19)

(-1 .21)

(0.303)

(0.355)

0.309

(-0.561 )

(0.811 )

(0.887)

-1.130

-1.147

(-2.14)**

(-2.17)**

0.205

0.184

0.879

0.871

(0.619)

(0.563)

(2.33)**

(2.32)**

0.505

0.982

0.966

(1.67)*

(2.85)***

(2.87)***

-1.095

-1.034

(-2.30)**

(-2.17)**

1.024

1.043

1.467

1.459

(2.73)

(2.80)***

(3.62)***

(3.62)***

-1 .243

-1.133

(-1 .62)

(-1.47)

0.589

0.615

0.246

0.282

(1.27)

(1.33)

(0.450)

(0.516)

1.036

1.031

(1 .28)

(1.28)

0.014

0.014

0.014

0 .014

(5.69)

(5.63)***

(4.50)***

(4.49)***

0.000

-0.001

(0.095)

(-0.116)

88.5%
37.1 %
1433

88.6%
37.2%
1433

Religious Attend x Lottery

Concordant
McFadden's R2
Sample Size

-1.710
(-2.97)***

(1.69)*

Atheist x Lottery
Religious Attendance

-1.725
(-3.00)***

0.523

Fundamentalist x Lottery
Atheist

0.337

-0.182

Baptist x Lottery
Fundamentalist

-1.035
(-2.35)**

(-0.608)

Methodist x Lottery
Baptist

-1.036
(-2.36)**

-0.198

Main Line x Lottery
Methodist

Property
MLE

(-3.26)***

Catholic x Lottery
Main Line Protestant

State Tax
MLE

88.4%
37.0%
1433

88.6%
37.2%
1433

T-Statistics in ( ). ***, **, * significant at the 1%,5%, 10% levels.
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Table 6. Perception and the Religious on the Level of Opposition
(Selective Coefficients from the Property Model)
Model 1

Model 2

Religious
Commitment

Fundamentalists

MLE

MLE

0.912
(3.13)***

1.21
(3.85)***

0.100
(0.155)

-0.591
(1.37)

1.04
(3.49)***

1.72
(4.56)***

1.60
(2.63)***

-1.44
(-2.32)**

0.862
(3.89)***

0.835
(3.21 )***

0.573
(0.943)

0.162
(0.360)

-1.25
(-4.19)***

-1.86
(-5.33)***

-0.259
(-0.290)

1.79
(2.95)***

0.003
(0.678)

0.014
(4.56)***

Concordant

88.9%

88.7%

McFadden's R 2

38.2%

37.9%

Sample

1433

1433

Pari-Mutuel State
Par-Mutuel x Religious D
Hurts Others
Hurts Others x Religious D
Increase Crime
Increase Crime x Religious D
Economic Benefit
Economic Benefit x Religious D
Religious Commitment

T-Statistics in ( ). ***, **, * significant at the 1%,5%, 10% levels.
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Table 7. Predicted Opposition to Lotteries From 1974 Attitudes
States
Year Adopted
Mean /Median Probability
(n)
32% /24%
Arizona
1981
(23)
44% 146%
Washington
1983
(25)
California
1985
29% I 19%
(184)
36% I 28%
Iowa
1985
(31)
Missouri
1986
50% I 55%
(42)
Florida
38% I 45%
1988
(29)
56% I 66%
Kentucky
1989
(30)
Texas
1991
53% I 58%
(39)
65% /72%
Arkansas
None
(32)

